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In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Bush administration described its plan for transforming the roles and structure of U.S. nuclear forces. The updated posture laid out plans to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons by building up conventional strike capabilities, missile defenses, and a more responsive and robust defense infrastructure. what is the appropriate division of labor between agencies responsible for maintaining U.S. nuclear forces; and, finally, has America's nuclear infrastructure been properly maintained? 6 An understanding of the role of U.S. nuclear weapons will help put these questions, on future nuclear policy, into perspective.
Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons
For more than a half century, U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy protected America against and expanding and domineering Soviet Union. The United States' nuclear weapons provided an effective counterbalance to the Soviet's vastly superior numbers of conventional forces compared with much fewer numbers of U.S. and NATO forces. Although the strategy behind using U.S. nuclear forces had shifted over the years from massive retaliation, to flexible response, then mutually assured destruction, the intent remained the same, to provide an "unblinking deterrent" against the threat of a formidable foe. 7 Up until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the subsequent collapse of what President Reagan dubbed the "Evil Empire,"
America's war planners had really only one opponent to plan against. Since then, however, that planning effort has become exponentially more complicated.
The demise of the Soviet Union as a super power at the end of 1991 left Russia with more than 16,600 strategic warheads; Ukraine with 1,568; Kazakhstan with 1,360; and Belarus with 54. One nuclear state had now become many. 8 In 1992, the former Soviet Republics of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan signed treaty protocols to return to Russia the dozens of nuclear warheads and launchers that had been deployed on their soil. Although reports indicate that all warheads had been returned to Russia by November 1996, 9 there are still fears that, more than a decade later, absolute Russian control over much of their nuclear material may be in question. This is due to the dozens of nuclear weapon bases and facilities, thousands of weapons, and hundreds of metric tons of fissile material on Russian soil, not to mention the thousands of nuclear scientists and technicians with access to nuclear materials and know-how that still live in Russia. 10 Even with U.S. and international assistance, this presents a huge oversight problem and one which causes current world leaders much concern. The possible proliferation of loosely guarded nuclear materials and aid from sympathetic weapons designers could provide non-state actors the ability to manufacture and use WMD.
But possessing nuclear weapons alone is not enough to deter the WMD threat. Over the first 50 years of their existence, the U.S. developed nuclear weapons and launch systems that were referred to as the Nuclear Triad based on their means of delivery, that is, air (bombers), sea (submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)), and land (intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)). To meet the emerging realities of today's global environment, a new mix of nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities is required for the "diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming decades." 11 The 2001 NPR introduced a New Triad in which the offensive systems just described, to include nonnuclear capabilities, make up just one leg of the New Triad. The other legs consist of active and passive defenses, and a responsive defense infrastructure, respectively. The main strategy behind the first Triad was to provide a credible deterrence, and should that deterrence fail, deliver sufficient forces to swiftly end aggression on terms favorable to the U.S. or its allies. The
New Triad supports the U.S. defense policy's four goals-assure, dissuade, deter, and defeat. 12 These goals allow strategic leaders more options in dealing with potential adversaries.
United States' friends and allies can be assured that, by maintaining nuclear forces, the U.S.
can respond to any nuclear threat. Enemy forces are dissuaded from attacking the U.S. or its allies by the presence of U.S. forces that are numerically superior, technologically more advanced, and highly reliable. U.S. nuclear forces provide deterrence against potential enemies by offering the President flexible response options that place enemy centers of gravity at risk.
Lastly, U.S. nuclear forces put overwhelming destructive power in the hands of the President to defeat any enemy. 13 Possessing the requisite weapons and facilities for deterrence is one thing, having sufficient personnel trained to operate and sustain the weapons complex is quite another.
Affect of Personnel Retirement on U.S. Arsenal
In 1999, the Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise submitted its final report to Congress and the secretary of Energy. Charged with developing a plan to recruit and retain personnel with scientific, engineering, and technical backgrounds to oversee the Department of Energy's nuclear program, the Commission identified twelve recommendations to overcome the challenges inherent in an aging workforce and to ensure a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile for the future. 14 Why the concern today, though, about an aging workforce?
It is no secret that as a population ages, it brings with it the demand for a country to adjust economically and educationally to meet new expectations. There is a greater cost in providing medical benefits which drains resources from other areas of national interest, such as maintaining a robust defense force. As people retire, there needs to be someone "in the pipeline" to replace them. States has 480 nuclear weapons deployed at eight bases in six European countries (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Turkey). One could argue that the main threat for which these weapons were deployed (defense from attack by the Soviet Union) has ended and these weapons, still at 1993 levels, can be removed. Some argue a second justification for their deployment, protection against proliferation of WMD, though valid, could be better achieved by conventional means or nuclear forces based outside Europe. 19 The NRDC report also highlighted the advantages of a nuclear-free Europe. One would be eliminating the need for non-nuclear NATO countries to maintain the capability to carry Europe. These include realigning U.S. nuclear forces to match other nuclear powers-keeping sovereign weapons on sovereign soil. The U.S. is the only country that bases nuclear weapons on foreign territory. Other benefits include the improvement of relations among NATO and non-NATO countries by responding to the will of their people uncomfortable with the current posture (one survey indicates three-fourths of Germans disapprove of the presence of nuclear weapons in their country); further reductions of Russian non-nuclear forces could be accelerated and our relationship with that country improved; nuclear basing in Europe makes broader negotiations on non-proliferation matters (i.e., Iran) more difficult; and forward-based nuclear weapons have little or no strategic value in the current political environment. 21 To meet NATO needs from abroad, the U.S. has an abundant number of weapons from which to choose including the means to deliver those weapons, including the SLBMs, ICBMs, and bombers mentioned earlier in this paper. Naturally, removing nuclear weapons from Europe will place an increased demand on the accuracy and timeliness of actionable intelligence to provide indications and warnings of the impending need for nuclear retaliation.
Up to this point, this paper has focused primarily on the first leg of the New Triad, offensive systems. What role does missile defense play in national deterrence?
Nexus between Missile Defense and Nuclear Posture
The purpose behind the United States' missile defense program is to deploy an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending United States territory, to include allies and friends, against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate). 22 The challenge, though, is that the U.S. could not get there from here without first withdrawing from its obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty co-signed with the Soviet Union in 1972.
The ABM Treaty was signed and ratified at the height of the Cold War when both countries had thousands of nuclear warheads pointed at each other and peace was assured under the premise of mutual assured destruction (MAD). The ABM treaty was so restrictive (no system capable of providing national-level defense could be developed) that the Soviets could only deploy a missile defense system around Moscow and the U.S. was limited to a site in North Dakota. Today's security environment is completely different, however. The Soviet Union is no more, Russia is a U.S. partner in many security and non-security related ventures, and new threats now face both countries. 23 Since withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the U.S. is now able to deploy a system designed not to just protect North Dakota from ballistic missile attack, but the entire U.S. and its friends and allies, as well.
While the end of the Cold War reduced the likelihood of a nuclear conflict between the U.S. and Russia, the threat from ballistic missiles has continued to grow due to the availability of WMD technology to countries hostile to the U.S. and its allies. What, exactly, is this threat?
As of 2000, more than 25 countries have developed or acquired ballistic missile systems. Bottom line, if the U.S. can field a credible missile defense system that involves the active participation of our friends and allies (which gives them a certain level of "ownership" in the process), we can lobby these other countries to reduce or eliminate their nuclear systems in exchange for the U.S. continuing to provide a nuclear protective umbrella (possibly at lower force levels than present) as a "hedge against future contingencies." 29 Furthering the partnerships between the U.S. and Russia as described above, and continuing cooperation with China economically on a global scale and with North Korea regionally, lessens the likelihood of armed conflict and allows nuclear related topics to be dealt with collegially. 30 The U.S. had to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy its missile defense system. How does such a system impact other treaty obligations?
Missile Defense Impact on Non-Proliferation Treaty Obligations
The intent of The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is "to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament." 31 As of April 2005, 189 states and parties have signed or acceded to the treaty making it the most widely adhered to of any arms control agreement.
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One of the provisions of the treaty, Article VI, deals directly with the issue of missile defense. This Article states, in effect, that the nuclear weapons states (U.S., Russia, China, France, and U.K.) will pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ending the nuclear arms race as soon as possible and to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control. 33 How does this impact the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system (BMDS)? By employing a robust and effective BMDS, a nation effectually negates the need for other countries to have nuclear weapons since they would be, in theory, ineffective against the defended country. This directly meets the intent of NPT Article VI, stopping the nuclear arms race and beginning disarmament.
The Bush administration further states that nonproliferation, deterrence, and missile defense complement each other in the United States' overall defense strategy. Weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation are the driving forces behind this strategy. As these threats are reduced, so is the sheer size of the threat that must be dealt with by missile defenses. Rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are less likely to invest in missiles if they believe they will be ineffective. Finally, a robust BMDS strengthens deterrence and keeps rogue states from blackmailing the United States, its friends or allies by threatening missile attack. 34 As further evidence of its excellent record in NPT compliance, the U.S.
reported to the 2005 NPT Review Conference that, by 2012, levels of deployed strategic nuclear warheads will have dropped 80% from 1991 levels (from 10,000 to 1,700-2,200) 35 and nonstrategic nuclear weapons have been reduced 90% (from 4,000 to 480). 36 John Bolton, prior to becoming U.S. ambassador to the U.N., was undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security. In this role, Ambassador Bolton echoed President Bush's stance on BMDS by stating such a system is important "not simply to prevent the catastrophe" of a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies, but to convince the potential possessors of ballistic missiles "not even to think about" developing them. As further assurance of U.S. intent to meet Article VI obligations, Bolton went on to say that as technology for BMDS matures, the U.S. will share it with friends and allies through NATO and other alliances. 37 This paper has, thus far, described offensive and defensive components of the U.S.
nuclear weapons complex. What agencies are responsible for operating and maintaining this huge complex?
Agencies Responsible for Maintaining U.S. Nuclear Forces
Identifying all of the agencies involved with, or responsible for, maintaining U.S. nuclear forces can be a daunting task. Determining the appropriate division of labor between them can be even more so. The nation's nuclear stockpile, both deployed and in storage, can be looked at as falling under three broad categories-research and development, requirements and employment, and inspections and oversight. Each of these includes a number of different agencies and literally thousands of people, and is worth looking into in more detail to appreciate the scope of America's nuclear enterprise.
The Departments of Defense (DoD) and Energy (DOE) share joint responsibility for nuclear weapons activities, under a 1983 Memorandum of Understanding between the two organizations. The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), as part of DOE, oversees the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) ensuring a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent absent the ability to conduct full-scale nuclear testing. This is accomplished through surveillance, assessment, maintenance, refurbishment, manufacture, and nuclear weapons dismantlement, as well as research and development and certification efforts. 38 The nuclear weapons complex is comprised of eight government-owned, contractor-operated facilities:
• Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), New Mexico, run by University of California; nuclear R&D, design, safety, and certification
• Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), California, run by University of California; nuclear R&D, design, safety, and certification The IAEA, an independent organization of the United Nations, stood up in 1957 as the international inspection agency for nuclear matters. The Agency, with a staff of 2,200 from more than 90 countries, has three goals-promoting safeguards and verification, promoting safety and security, and promoting science and technology. Under the first goal, the IAEA verifies that safeguarded nuclear material and activities are not being used for military purposes.
They also act as the inspection arm of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and play a pivotal role in enforcing the conditions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The second goal, promoting safety and security, calls for them to help countries upgrade nuclear safety and security, and prepare for and respond to emergencies. Finally, by promoting science and technology, the IAEA helps developing countries find peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology to meet critical needs. The IAEA reports annually to the UN General Assembly and, as required, to the UNSC. 44 Other agencies also have a role in the safety of nuclear materials and facilities.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was formed in 1975 to regulate the nation's civilian use of nuclear materials to ensure public health and safety, promote defense and security, and protect the environment. The 3,000 person NRC has three main areas of concern, nuclear reactors, nuclear materials, and nuclear waste. 45 The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) was established by Congress in 1988 as an independent federal agency within the Executive Branch to provide safety oversight of the nuclear weapons complex operated by the Department of Energy and "to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety" at DOE's defense nuclear facilities. 46 This 100-person agency looks at four areas of the nuclear weapons complex; nuclear weapon operations, nuclear material processing and stabilization, nuclear facilities design and infrastructure, and nuclear safety programs and analysis. As an example of its findings, in its 2006 report to Congress, DNFSB identified the risks associated with a conscious effort by DOE senior management to lessen federal oversight. These risks were due to the emphasis of productivity over safety, loss of technical competence among DOE upper management, insufficient safety research, and inadequate central safety oversight. In their findings, they also identified a fouryear corrective program to reverse this trend. 47 All of these agencies have a tremendous responsibility in ensuring the effectiveness of this Nation's nuclear weapons complex. How well have they done?
Maintenance of the Nuclear Infrastructure Has America's nuclear infrastructure been properly maintained? Several experts agree that the answer is "No!" More than 15 years ago, DOE identified improvements that needed to be made for the nation to maintain and modernize its nuclear weapons complex. However, with the demise of the Cold War in 1991, these improvements never came to fruition. 48 In 1999, DoD's Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (OSD/PA&E), estimated it would take $450M annually for 17 years to refurbish the nation's nuclear weapons production complex.
At the same time, the Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise reported there was no comprehensive plan to address required space reductions or modernizing facilities, nor address current and future maintenance requirements. To say what level is actually enough is debatable, however, once this decision is made, strong national leadership is required to ensure the reliability of this nation's nuclear weapons.
There must continue to be ongoing dialogue between the world's nuclear weapons states as to future levels necessary for effectiveness considering advances in technology and the impact of global WMD proliferation.
With respect to an aging workforce and its impact on the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, this is a matter that needs to be watched closely and addressed promptly. The government should immediately provide incentives for students to pursue advanced degrees and strongly encourage internships with industry. This will have the dual positive impact of combining education with experience to keep the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and related fields second to none. We see everyday the impact that technology and automation have on job opportunities. If the U.S. does not reverse the downward trend of graduates receiving advanced degrees in scientific and technical fields, it will lose its ability to maintain and expand its leadership role in these areas.
The U.S. should continue to work closely with its allies and the UN to help meet their security needs and eliminate nuclear weapons overseas. Reducing and, eventually, eliminating U.S. nuclear weapons overseas will have a stabilizing effect on relations with European nations and others around the world. The pursuit of more "nuclear weapons free zones" further enhances peaceful relations by minimizing the possibility of WMD materiel falling into the hands of nation-states and non-state actors with evil intent.
To help meet global security needs, and to counter the effects of WMD proliferation, the U.S. should continue development and deployment of a robust missile defense system. While the old adage, the U.S. has to be effective all the time against attack while the enemy only has to be effective once, still applies, having a missile defense system is one more layer of defense against such attack. Sharing the technology with our allies and having them play an active role in our nations' mutual defense only strengthens our relationships and further hampers an enemy. A robust and effective defensive system also allows the U.S. to further reduce its reliance on offensive systems, both here and abroad, thus minimizing the need to keep such systems at their current levels.
Pursuing missile defense programs also allows the world's nuclear powers to meet their NPT Article VI obligations. The U.S. and Russia can lower the levels of their nuclear warhead stockpiles while still providing for the collective security of their allies from rogue attack. Having fewer warheads also has the collateral effect of keeping such warheads out of the hands of these rogue actors. Such posturing also sets an example for other countries that currently possess or are pursuing indigenous nuclear weapons. Although there will, most likely, always be countries that desire to have nuclear weapons of their own (Iran and North Korea come to mind) the leadership of the U.S., Russia, and their allies can rally the court of world opinion against these rogue states.
The current division of labor between agencies responsible for various aspects of the U.S.
nuclear weapons complex seems adequate, but needs continued government oversight.
Although the roles between research and development, requirements and employment, and inspections and oversight provide a type of "checks and balances" for the program, areas highlighted earlier in this paper, primarily research, inspections, and oversight, need to be closely monitored to ensure the United States' program, as well as other nation's programs, remain safe and secure.
Finally, the evidence is clear that the U.S. has not been a good steward of its nuclear infrastructure. Each organization must take an active role in seeing that systems and facilities under its purview are properly funded, maintained, modified, or eliminated, as needed, to ensure the Nation's nuclear arsenal continues to remain current, effective, credible, safe, and secure.
Just because the primary threat for which much of the nuclear weapons complex was developed is no longer viable, maintaining that infrastructure, or making a concerted effort to adjust it to meet current world realities, has never been more important. A structure built on sand will eventually crumble and fall, but one built upon a solid foundation will withstand the test of time.
What, then, is the answer to the question at the beginning of this paper, "The Future of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Boom or Bust?" It should be clear by now that, while this Nation is not expanding its nuclear weapons complex at the explosive rate seen during the 1960's to 1980's, neither is it being reduced to nonexistence. The United States' nuclear forces are undergoing an evolution to meet the realities of the world in which we live. The Soviet Union is no more, but rogue states and non-state actors are actively pursuing their own nuclear programs, to include weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. is meeting its national security needs, the needs of its friends and allies, as well as adhering to its international treaty obligations, by reducing the levels of its nuclear forces, developing a missile defense system, investing in its nuclear infrastructure, and ensuring it recruits and retains an effective and forward thinking workforce. 
